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"THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN GROUPS FOR THE DIVISION OF WEALTH."

Wallace deOrtega Maxey.

INTRODUCTION

Psychological Factors, or Background.

How far does a logical separation correspond to a real separation in the psychological process by which men in fact arrive at responsible decisions? No simple answer to this question is, I believe, possible. In nine out of ten of their daily, more or less habitual, decisions men are not conscious of any distinction between rational calculation and emotional impulse. But, ever since the beginning of recorded human experience men, when faced with some new problem of action, have noticed the appearance in themselves of two kinds of impulse pointing to different and inconsistent decisions. The one kind of impulse is, in its simplest form, an immediate and "primary" reaction of fear, sex-love, mother-love, anger, loyalty, etc., to some external stimulus which is directly perceived and whose significance is instinctively recognized (I). The other kind of impulse is much slower

in appearing, has less immediate force, and normally follows after an interval of reflection or reasoning during which memories and inferences are combined and rearranged and new significances are discovered. This "secondary" kind of impulse may follow from or lead to the stimulation of one of the same instincts as its primary rival; but it has less driving force, and the original stimulation, in passing a series of imaginative associations, is apt to lose its sense of vivid reality. Yet early proverbs, such as "look before you leap," indicate that our ancestors recognized that the weaker secondary impulse was generally a safer guide to action than the stronger primary impulse. When men distinguished in words between "mind" and "body," they were apt to ascribe the primary impulses to the "body" and the secondary to the "mind." St. Paul may have been using language already traditional when he wrote on the "law in my members warring against the law of my mind" (Romans vii:23) (2). When modern anatomists and physiologists began to examine and compare the nervous systems of man and other animals, they related this recurring conflict between "reason" and "emotion," or "instinct" to differences in origin and structure between the more recently developed "neo-pallium" of the mammalian forebrain on the one hand, and on the other, the "sympathetic" nervous system and the more primitive parts of the lower brain (3). In 1922, for instance, Sir Charles Sherrington, in his address as President of the British Association, spoke of the "main seat of the mind" as a "comparatively modern structure (the cortex of the forebrain) superimposed on the non-mental and more ancient other nervous parts."(Presidential Address, British Assoc.,1922,p.9)(4).

The work of C. Spearman, whose methods are psychological rather than physiological, seems to point also to the reality of a functional separation between the human emotional and rational systems. His ingenious mathematical analysis of the results of intelligence tests reveals the existence of a general, probably intellectual, factor which he calls "G" which can be tested in isolation from "emotional" endowments.(C.Spearman, "Abilities of men," p.197) (5).

Meanwhile, however, on the physiological side, recent work by Professor K. S. Lashley and others tends to show that the necessary localization of functions in different regions of the mammalian brain has been over-emphasized. Study, also, of the action of the "hormones" - the secretions discharged from the ductless glands into the blood-stream - indicates that their function in promoting or restraining nervous energy, acts both in the cortical regions and in the more primitive parts of the nervous system. The influence of the hormones on the whole system interacts, as a factor in the process of judgement, with other normal or abnormal contents of the blood-stream - with the causes, for instance,which make us take "jaundiced" or "hectic", or "eupeptic views of events. And the continuously conscious personality, that co-ordinating factor which laboratory psychologists find so baffling, influences every aspect and section of the conditions of judgement. Above all, it seems to be true that, in a normal human being, the stimulation either of the "Rational" or of the "instinctive" and "emotional" section of our nervous system is likely to produce a stimulation, whether stronger or weaker, of the other section. The process of decision may, in any particular case, be mainly rational or mainly emotional, but emotion is likely to be accompanied

by more or less conscious "reasoning," and reasoning by more or less conscious emotion.

In the present stage, therefore, of the discussion between experts, one is probably justified in concluding that the old distinction between "reason" and "emotion" corresponds to a real but often over-simplified psychological truth, and that human judgement requires a successful co-operation, which is neither inevitable nor impossible, between two imperfectly co-ordinated psychological factors. As C. S. Myers said, from the chair of the Psychological Section of the British Association in 1931, "Valuation and volition achieve their highest plane with the harmonious co-operation of the highest products of these two evolutionary paths, sentiment and intelligence"(Psychological Section, British Assoc.,1931,p.190)(6). The problem of judgement is therefore quantitative, one neither of absolute co-operation nor of absolute non-co-operation, but of more or less co-operation, though it would be tiresome to always state it in that form.

One may roughly divide the instances of co-operation between reason and emotion into those which are mainly "natural; i.e., which are mainly due to the inborn nature of the person deciding, combined with his personal experience and memories, and the habits resulting from them; and those which are mainly "artificial;" i.e., due to the "social heritage" of education and discipline which has been handed down to him by preceding generations, and to his conscious efforts to act in accordance with that heritage. The more "natural" type of intellectual , emotional co-operation may be seen, not in the rapid and often half conscious "intelligent behaviour" of our daily life, but also in prolonged periods of imaginative reverie. A stage in such a

period of reverie among the anthropoids is indicated by Kohler's photograph of his clever young ape, Sultan, thoughtfully fitting two bamboos together (The Mentality of the Apes, S.W.Kohler) (7). The intellectual association-trains excited by the sight of the two bamboos inside his wired enclosure and the banana outside co-operated with his desire to eat, and produced, after an interval of reverie, an illuminating recognition of the "situation"(Gestalt) "Bamboos-banana," followed by the invention of a solution by fitting the smaller bamboo into the larger. We can observe or imagine another instance of the same prolonged "natural" emotional-intellectual co-operation in a young human mother who is watching her sleeping baby. Her whole being throbs with love for him, and her love co-operates automatically with a series of intellectual dream-pictures of his future. Just as a big-brained Aurignacian ancestress might see her son a fisherman, or fighting man, or chief, so she sees hers a naval officer, a laywer, or a doctor. Her mood, if she puts it into words, may lie halfway between "he will be a sailor," and "he shall be a sailor," and finally may merge itself into a more definitely intellectual calculation of practical plans. Even a modern social thinker, among all the difficulties of industrial civilization and the complexities of his own intellectual history, goes through periods in which his emotions and his reason co-operate and strengthen each other without friction and without effort. For example, a New Yorker, born and bred in his city, and I were walking along the upper portion of Riverside Drive near Dr. Fosdick's Church and Columbia University. As we glanced out over the river and then over the stretch of University buildings, he said, "Here is a city for men and women to live in, and not for machines or giants." In each of us, as we looked,

love for New York flowed in one stream with the emotions which constitute the "public spirit" of a modern social reformer - pity and hope for those who live and will live in our crowded streets, the aesthetic sense of beauty, and the craftsman's preference for order and efficiency rather than confusion and waste. And, as we talked on our way down the Drive, our emotions co-operated with calculations of ways and means in the growth of a purpose to prevent, as far as we could, the great cities from being dehumanized.

Man belongs to a partially "social" (or gregarious) species, and a "social" stimulus acts on him differently from other stimuli. A man who finds himself on a crumbling cliff-edge or in the pathway of a falling stone is "instinctively" afraid and "instinctively" stirred to calculation as to means of securing his personal safety. But, in the presence of a screaming child, or a beautiful woman, or when he is a member of a group of hunters or fighters, his special social instincts of pity,and love,and loyalty, and protectiveness, with the allied social instincts of jealousy and resentment, are stimulated. He then may feel an "unselfish" urge toward co-operative action. If that urge is logically analysed, it can be divided into an intellectual assumption that his fellows (like class) are similar in important respects to himself, and that their feelings are similar to his own, combined with an emotional impulse to satisfy their desires and to recognize that their safety or happiness or "good" somehow "matters" to him, though such an analysis necessarily distorts any description of what is an essentially integrated process (8). Traditional logic comes nearer to descriptive truth when the original instinctive impulse is combined with a more definitely "selfish" calculation that his own good depends on the co-operation of his fellows.

A further characteristic of the human species is that these "social instincts" can be made active by other stimuli than the presence or idea of our fellow-men. The history of religion is full of instances in which social emotions are directed toward a conception of the universe as a whole (9). Experience of the social results of the emotional-intellectual co-ordination in reverie may have led our distant ancestors to recognize "wisdom" as a special human faculty valuable to the group as well as to the individual, and to give that faculty a name. We can guess, for instance, at a growing recognition that some men are born more wise than others. Such men would have from birth a greater range and delicacy of intellectual association than other men, a greater force and clearness in those emotions of sympathy, and loyalty, and courage which have special social importance, and greater ease in attaining that co-operation between reason and socially valuable emotion which we might call "social judgment."

We can understand why a primitive tribe felt it worth while to encourage a born "seer" to retire into the wilderness for periods of creative reverie, and why they brought him food during his retirement and asked his advice when he returned. If Einstein had lived a hundred thousand years ago, he would perhaps have been dimly recognized as a "wise" man, as one in whom the perpetual conflict of thought and passion which weakened and bewildered other men, did not take place. The New York Times reviewer of a little biography of Einstein, who must have known him personally, writes of "Einstein's remarkable homogeneity as man and thinker.....Einstein is all of a piece.....his social behaviour, his political views, his general interests, all seem to be the spontaneous manifestations of a profoundly

integrated nature. There is no division in him."(10) (N.Y. Times June 19, 1931).

Sometimes the slowly acting processes of the born seer and the rapid practical decision of the born man of action are found in different individuals (12). Sometimes, both today and a hundred thousand years ago, they have been combined in one person. No man had more effective power of practical decision than the late Sir David Bruce, who spent himself in fighting against the insect-borne diseases of Africa, and that power was combined in him with a rare degree of creative intellectual-emotional imagination. Of him a friend wrote in an obituary notice, "His imagination kept him always one step ahead of his observations; his judgment told him where that step should lie; energy spurred him on and the shrewdest common sense held him back from unsafe conclusions." And another person speaks of his "indefinable intuition, almost mystical in its working." Man must soon have noticed a difference in the type of natural judgment characteristic of different ages of life. Old age, with its subdued passions and long personal experiences, was sometimes a safer guide than youth or middle age; and the "elders" must at times have been called upon, as in Homer's description of the Shield of Achilles, to decide the angry disputes of early society.

But the long history of man's painful groping after security and happiness shows how precarious were even the most exceptional powers of natural judgment without the "social heritage" of accumulated and transmitted knowledge,and inventions,and ideals. One can imagine a primitive Sir David Bruce, with his iron muscles and "mystic intuition," but with little TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, leading, by general consent, a group of his fellows

through fifty years of gathering the fruit and grubs whose significance for their needs they instinctively recognized; and a score of primitive Einsteins, without much help from the past, may have noticed and foreseen and rejoiced in the recurring signs of spring plenty, in forest or lagoon.

But most of these primitive discoveries of the causes and effects, and the rights of ownership and its dignity, must have died with the inventors or their children. And even in tribes unusually fertile of invention, among whom customs were being slowly established; e.g., The Hebrews, which made more easy the transmission of knowledge from generation to generation, men's "social heritage" was never secure against destruction by the extermination or enslavement or impoverishment of a single generation. A few tall skeletons with ample brain cases, a few hundred exquisitely wrought flints, and the cave-drawings which our artists can now admire but cannot imitate, are all that is left of those Paleolithic peoples who, by the help of a genius greater than ours, had accumulated artistic traditions, some of which we are now painfully trying to reconstruct.

11. The Art of Judgment (the determining factor in the Division of Wealth).

Though particular religious and educational expedients for the strengthening and direction of emotion exist, there is as yet no generally accepted "art of feeling." And future historians of the twentieth century may notice, as one of the characteristics of our time, a temporarily increasing confusion as to the possibility and method of any art of directing the combination of thought and emotion in judgment. We know that emotion may be increased by a clear, rational conviction that causes will have results, and that reasoning may be enriched by emotion, but we have not yet

learned how to use that knowledge. We, in America and Europe, owe the first conception of the possibility of such an art of judgment to a few thinkers in the trading-cities of Ancient Greece. Cicero, when, after the fall of Greek power, he was considering the possibility of a consciously directed civilization within the rising Roman Empire, said, "The mother of all good things is wisdom (sophia) from the love of which philosophy received its Greek name." (1) (Laws, 1,22,58).

In the seventh century B.C., the creative center of Western civilization was moving from Egypt to the Aegean, where Greek technical improvements in Semitic alphabetic writing were superseding the clumsy symbols of Egyptian hieroglyphics and Babylonian cuneiform. In the fourth and fifth centuries B.C., it was possible for Greek thinkers to compose treatises which expressed the whole mind of their writers, and which could be passed in easily-read copies from hand to hand, and from generation to generation.

Cicero was right when he dated the characteristic Greek contribution to the art of wise judgment from the moment when Socrates "called down philosophy from heaven".....from the cosmic speculations of Pythagoras and the Ionian physicists - to the "cities of men," and the problems of human conduct.(2) And men's knowledge of Socrates' thought, after his death, was first made possible when Plato asked, in unforgettable literary form, nearly all the questions which our social thinkers are asking today. Plato, in his Republic, seeks to discover how men can escape from the seditions and wars which were already destroying the glorious promise of Hellenic culture, and from the confusion of <u>mind</u> and <u>motive</u> which made social confusion inevitable. He answers that men can only secure individual

satisfaction and social peace by methodical effort. In the Republic, he explains that the purpose of that effort should be to secure the harmony of reason and passion which he calls "justice," and which I would describe as a necessary condition of successful judgment. Plato's account of the means of securing harmony in the soul is, in some points, nearer to the psychology of the twentieth century than to that of the nineteenth century. Scientists are beginning now to recognize the "hormic" physiological forces as energizing the processes, both of associative thought and of the emotions (3). Plato classifies the same facts by distinguishing between the "rational" principle, the "spirited" (i.e.,Hormic) principle, which he identifies with anger and which gives power to the decisions of the reason, and the bodily passions, which the reason, with the help of the "spirited principle" can control, just as in his imaginary Republic the magistrates, who are the "reason" of the State, govern with the help of the soldiers who are its executive force. "Is it not," he asks, "the province of the rational principle to command, inasmuch as it is wise and has to exercise forethought on behalf of the whole soul, and the province of the spirited principle to be its subject and ally?" And he adds a plea, which educators may understand more clearly fifty years hence than they do now, for the cultivation of aesthetic and muscular feelings as a means of harmonizing the whole personality of his Guardians. In words intended to suggest the action of a lyre-player tuning his instrument, he asks, "Will not the combination of music, literature, and all forms of art, and gymnastics bring them - the rational and spirited principles - into unison; tightening and strengthening the one string by noble words and scientific teaching, and loosening, soothing, and taming the other by harmony and rhythm?"(4) (Republic, Book iv).

Plato's pupil, Aristotle, was a trained biologist and a careful student of contemporary forms of government. In his "Ethics and Politics" he tried to lay the foundation of a State in which every citizen should command and obey. He, like Plato, had experience of that mystic contemplation which he believed to be the noblest activity of man's life. But he relied, as the motive force of his polity, not on the absolute rule of a group of illuminated dictators whom the rest obeyed as the servant obeys his master, or the soldier his officer, but on the formation by every thoughtful citizen of a habit of deliberate moral choice.

For the production of that habit, he relied on the education both of thought and of feeling. And, instead of integrating all feeling in the philosophers' vision of the absolute good, he dwelt on the special importance of the social instincts and in particular of the "affection" felt for the State by its members.

The successors of Plato and Aristotle differed among themselves on many points of ethics and metaphysics. But they kept alive in the Graeco-Roman world tradition of philosophy as a conscious art of wisdom accessible to all who were able and willing to practise it, and offering guidance both to individuals and to States.

To us who are now watching the spread of our "scientific" culture throughout America and the Eurasian continents, the causes of the ultimate failure of the Greek philosophy to establish itself in Mediterranean Europe are as important as the causes of its immediate success. Certain of these causes are obvious enough. The Greek never secured the free cities, which were the seed-bed of the Greek imagination, from external invasion or internal

decay. They never established, for more than a few years, any self-governing political unit larger than a city-state. They never learned to control the death-rate in their walled harbour towns, or so to direct sex customs and marriage as to secure racial progress or even continuity; and they never invented an effective substitute for slavery as a basis of organized industry. Both the strength and the weakness of Greek philosophy were put to the test when, among the Greek-speaking Jews of Antioch and Alexandria, Greek culture, between 200 B.C. and 100 A.D. came into contact with the religions of Israel.

That contact was fatal to Greek philosophy as an organized discipline and ultimately substituted for it the Christian religion, which was to dominate European civilization from the fifth to the eighteenth centuries and which still influences the process of judgment both among Western Christians and Western non-Christians. The Books of the Old Testament seem to show that already in the eighth century B.C., two hundred years before Pythagoras founded his school of ascetic morals at Krotona, and three hundred years before Socrates began to teach, Amos(5) and Hosea(6) were already in conscious and angry revolt against much of the popular religion of their day, and were calling on their readers to prefer righteousness and justice to burnt offerings, and meat offerings(7).

In 332 B.C. Alexander, the pupil of Aristotle, marched through Palestine on his way to the conquest of Egypt and the foundation of Alexandria. After his death Palestine became a part, first of the empire of the Ptolemies, and later the Selucid kingdom whose Greek despots had their capital at Antioch. The Ptolemies welcomed Jewish settlers in Alexandria, and the

Jews shared in the Greek-spreading intellectual life which was centered in the great Library and College.

From this situation arose two main types of Jewish thought, one centered among the Aramaic-speaking and Hebrew-reading thinkers of Palestine, and the other among the Greek-speaking Jews of Alexandria, who read Jewish scriptures in the Septuagint translation. The result of all this was, of course, the Wisdom Literature. But a modern thinker, who comes from Plato and Aristotle to the Wisdom Literature in search of help for the exercise of social judgment in the modern world, is conscious that, in the transition from the fourth-century Athens to first-century Alexandria, something essential has been lost. In the Alexandrian Wisdom writings, we are constantly made to realize that the writers are not free philosophers who are training free citizens to exercise judgment on behalf of a consciously self-governed community, but subjects of a semi-Oriental despot, who are themselves without settled political and social rights, and are dependent for all success on the caprice of the holders of power (8). Intermingled with the beautiful descriptions of the exaltation of the soul to be reached by self-discipline, are promises of a rather mean type of material prosperity. The wise man may hope to judge his fellows, but he will do so because he has found favor with the monarch.

The Greek philosophies had owed the measure of success which they achieved to the fact that they had given each disciple something more than a mere command to live "justly" or in "accordance with nature." They offered him a logically coherent account of the universe by which his emotions of religious awe and aesthetic ecstasy could be stirred, and by which, with the

help of the newly elaborated rules of logic he could deduce the consequences of his action in time and eternity. And they also offered him membership of a society which, as long as it held together, could stimulate his instincts of solidarity and affection, and by which the intellectual and emotional habits of himself and his children could be formed. Each philosophic school offered him also the story of a founder whose example they could imitate and whose personality they could love. But those who, during the first centuries of the Christian era, built up that Catholic faith which was defined at Nicaea and organized by Gregory the Great, and to preserve which, in the sixteenth century, the leaders of the counter Reformation fought, were not philosophers quietly considering the conditions of success in the process of "social judgment." They were passionate East-Mediterranean devotees, determined to spread abroad a message whose authority would, they felt , disappear if its meaning were not made clear, and if its preachers were not compelled to agree in their statement of that meaning.

Most non-Catholic thinkers would not recognize that the creators of Latin-Catholic Christianity made a grievous mistake in emphasizing rather the "dogmas" which were the conclusions of their reasoning than the "method" by which those conclusions were to be formed. Each School of Greek philosophy had its own dogmas, but Greek philosophy never lost its conception of itself as a method. In the second bok of Laws, Plato, who turned in his despair to the authority of the Delphic priesthood yet writes, as he did in the Republic, "let us follow whithersoever the argument leads us."

As soon as Catholic Christianity announced that its message was not a method of attaining wisdom but an unchangeable and supernaturally ordained

faith, "once for all," as it was said by the second-century writer of the Epistle of St. Jude, "delivered unto the saints," belief in that faith became the supreme duty of the Christian and disbelief the supreme sin. Very early in the history of Christianity, it came to be an article of faith that God had decreed that the sin of disbelief, or even non-belief, would be punished by an eternity of torment in hell (9).

At the Reformation, indeed, the first steps toward a right of private judgment in Christendom were won, not by argument, but by force. Protestantism in Germany and England could develop its strictly limited conception of intellectual freedom because Luther, in the Wartburg, and Queen Elizabeth, at Tilbury, could say to the unconvinced rulers of the Church: "I am here; burn me if you can."(10)

The Medieval Background
(Class Struggle)

In the light of the foregoing, the following will be easily understood. Apart from the color which it took from its environment, medieval social theory had reasons of its own for holding that business, as distinct from labour, required some special justification. The suspicion of economic motives had been one of the earliest elements in the social teaching of the church and was to survive till Calvanism endowed the "life of economic enterprise with a new sanctification." In medieval philosophy the ascetic tradition, which condemned all commerce as the sphere of iniquity, was softened by a recognition of practical necessities, but it was not obliterated; and, if reluctant to condemn, it was insistent to warn. For it was of the essence of trade to drag into a position of solitary prominence the

acquisitive appetites; and toward those appetites, which to most modern thinkers have seemed the one sure social dynamic, the attitude of the medieval theorist was that of one who holds a "wolf by the ears." The craftsman labors for his living; he seeks what is sufficient to support him and no more. The merchant aims, not merely at livelihood, but at profit. The traditional distinction was expressed in the words of Gratian: "Whosoever buys a thing, not that he may sell it whole and unchanged and as he bought it, that man is of the buyers and sellers who are cast forth from God's Temple" (1) (Decretum, Pt.1). By very definition a man who "buys in order that he may sell dearer," the trader, is moved by an inhuman concentration on his own pecuniary interest, unsoftened by any tincture of public spirit or private charity. He turns what should be a means into an end, and his occupation , therefore, is "justly condemned since, regarded in itself, it serves the lust of gain"(2) (ibid).

There is no place in medieval theory for economic activity which is not related to a moral end, and to found a science of society upon the assumption that the appetite for economic gain is a constant and measurable force, to be accepted, like other natural forces, as an inevitable and self-evident datum would have appeared to the medieval thinker as hardly less irrational or less immoral than to make the premise of social philosophy the unrestrained operation of such necessary human attributes as pugnacity to the sexual instinct. The outer is ordained for the sake of the inner, economic goods are instrumental. "It is lawful to desire temporal blessings, not putting them in the first place, as though setting up our rest in them, but regarding them as aids to blessedness, inasmuch as they support our corporal life

and serve as instruments for acts of virtue" (3) (Summa - Aquinas). Riches exist for man, not man for riches.

In the words of a famous, or notorious, Bull: "The way of religion is to lead the things which are lower to the things which are higher through the things which are intermediate. According to the law of the universe, all things are not reduced to order equally and immediately; but the lowest through the intermediate, the intermediate through the higher"(4)(The Bull Unam Sactam of Boniface VIII). Thus, the social institutions assume a character which may almost be called sacramental, for they are the outward and imperfect expression of a supreme spiritual reality. Ideally conceived, society is an organism of different grades, and human activities form a hierarchy of functions which differ in kind and in significance, but each of which is of value on its own plane, provided that it is governed, however remotely, by the end which is common to all.

The facts of class status and inequality were rationalized in the Middle Ages by a functional theory of society, as the facts of competition were rationalized in the eighteenth by the theory of economic harmonies; and the former took the same delight in contemplating the moral purpose revealed in social organization as the latter in proving that, to the curious mechanism of human society, a moral purpose was superfluous or disturbing. Society, like the human body, is an organism composed of different members. Each member has its own function, prayer, or defense, or merchandise, or tilling the soil. Each must receive the means suited to its station, and must claim no more. Within classes, then, there must be equality; if one takes into his hand the living of two, his neighbor will go short; between classes

there must be inequality; for otherwise a class cannot perform its function, or - a strange thought to us - enjoy its rights. Peasants must not encroach on those above them. Lords must not despoil peasants. Craftsmen and merchants must receive what will maintain them in their calling, and no more.

If the medieval moralist was often too naive in expecting sound practice as the result of lofty principles alone, he was at least free from that not unfashionable form of credulity which expects it from their absence or from their opposite. To say that the men to whom such teaching was addressed went out to rob and cheat is to say no more than that they were men. Nor is it self-evident that they would have been more likely to be honest if they had been informed, like some of their descendants, that competition was designed by Providence to provide "an automatic substitute for honesty." Society was interpreted in short, not as the expression of economic self-interest, but as held together by a system of mutual, though varying, obligations. Social well-being exists, it was thought, insofar as each class performs its functions and enjoys the rights proportioned thereto.

We must keep in mind, however, that the wealth of the Medieval aristocracy was associated with the land, while that of industrial capitalists with particular enterprises; both had a tangible form and definite habitation. Contemporary capitalist fortunes, on the contrary, are liquid, mobile, intangible, a mass of paper rights to ownership. At the basis of this development are the concentration of industry, the separation of ownership, management, and control, and the transformation of the industrial capitalist into the financial capitalist. One aspect of these developments

is the increasing importance of the passive, wholly parasitic rentier, the mere clipper of coupons. It has been estimated that individual trusts managed by banks for their owners, whose only function is to receive and spend the income, are worth over twenty-five billion dollars. The value of such trusts for national banks alone, rose from nine hundred twenty-two million in 1926 to four billion, three hundred nineteen million in 1930. Ownership here is separated even from management or administration; private income is drawn from collectively produced and collectively managed wealth. Modern wealth is separated from direct participation in industry; its owners are absentee capitalists, with management and control assuming institutional forms. Because of this, the possession of wealth does not carry responsibilities with regard to the sources from which it is derived. The Lord of the Manor had definite obligations, either legal or customary, to the tenants of his land, the serfs who cultivated his domains, and his household servants. Where the industrial capitalist recognized obligations to the workers in his factory, or the consumers of his product, they were forced upon him by his identification with a particular enterprise. The modern capitalist, whose fortune is scattered in scores of corporate enterprises and perhaps in almost as many countries, effectively escapes such responsibilities. Even if he owns a large block of securities in a particular enterprise, he may plead that the responsibility is not his but that of management. Thus, in 1926, when John D. Rockefeller Jr. was asked to influence the management of a railroad, which was waging ruthless war upon its striking workers, the unctuous son of an unctuous father replied, "The facts are that combined holdings of our family, together with those of the

funds to which this stock may have been given, represent considerably less than 25% of the stock of this company." He was, however, the largest single stockholder. "Only two of the twelve directors can be regarded in any sense as representatives of our interests. The management of this company is entirely in the hands of the Board of Directors and, no matter what my personal views may be, I don't control the situation."(5) (Editorial, "Does responsible Ownership function?" New Republic,Apr.21,1926). This is a clear example of relations of private claims to ownership persisting within what are essentially collective or social forms of production and management. Wealth has assumed a form which makes it ripe for expropriation and socialization; the wealth expropriated from the products reverts to them in the form of social property, serving the whole of society. For the antagonism between the two opposites, proletariat and wealth is, in the words of Marx, resolved by the synthesis of socialism, in which both private property and the proletariat disappear (6).

Modern Thought on the Subject

Plato had hoped that philosophers would learn the secret of harmonizing reason and emotion by following single-mindedly "whithersoever the argument led them." But philosophers and economists have seldom entered on a new period of creative energy, or acquired authority in the society of their time, unless their emotion and reason have been stimulated by external events as well as by the course of argument, and, unless those events have also influenced their less philosophic and economic contemporaries. The creative period of Greek thought followed, not only upon the cosmic speculation of the Ionian Physicists and the moral philosophizing of Plato and Aristotle, but also upon the noble,

and fears, and ambitions stirred among the whole free population of Athens by Marathon and Salamis and by the control of Greek fleets over the east Mediterranean trade-routes. Creative periods of Christianity followed, not only on the contact of Greek and Jewish systematic thought in Alexandria and Antioch, and of early Christian and Persian thought in Augustine's fourth-century Africa, or on the study of the Greek philosophic literature among Moorish and Jewish philosophers in twelfth-century Spain; but also upon the emotional and intellectual stresses set up, during a thousand years, by the expansion, the internal organization, and the ultimate disintegration of the Roman Empire (1).

The "new philosophy" of Galileo(2) provided its own widespread stimulus in the hope which it offered to all mankind of a limitless increase of human control over nature. But the rapid development of that philosophy, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as summed up for instance, in Diderot's Encyclopedia(1751-65), was also helped by the concentration of force and wealth in the new European national states, by the rise of oceanic trade and by the passions of commercial wars (3). So, in the early years of the nineteenth century, British social thought was influenced not only by the logically consistent speculations of Locke (4) and Hartley, and Bentham, but also by the passions of hope and fear,and pity, and acquisitiveness which followed the rise of mechanical industry in northern Britain, the economic needs of the Napoleonic wars, and the economic and political results of the Peace of Paris in 1815. And those passions affected not only the professed philosophers and economists, like Bentham(5), and the Mills, and Carlyle, who tried to think out the whole problem of human conduct, but also the

statesmen and men of affairs who were interested in particular aspects of the course of events and who stood between the philosophers and the unthinking "practical people." Since the most pressing problems of the time were, after 1815, rather economic than religious, or nationalist, these sectional thinkers mainly concerned themselves with political economy, and started from the position reached by Adam Smith forty years earlier.

In 1817, when the post-war economic depression was becoming unmistakable, the stockbroker, David Ricardo, published his "Principles of Political Economy," which James Mill had persuaded him to write. In 1825 McCulloch, the newspaper editor, published his "Political Economy." Robert Owen, the successful cotton-spinner, published, in 1815, his "Observations on the Effect of the Manufacturing System," and Place, the retired master tailor, his "Principles of Population," in 1822. An anticipation of Marxian economics is to be found in the work of Thomas Hodgskin, the retired naval officer, who formulated his Socialist application to the Ricardian economic analysis in correspondence with Place in 1820, and published his "Labour Defended," in 1825.

Bentham, who died in 1832, and James Mill, who published a Political Economy in 1821 and died in 1836, represented, during this period, the philosophic Utilitarianism which overlapped and was overlapped by the more specialized economic work. All these writers were in close emotional contact with contemporary events. And no British social or economic thinker, who is now remembered, then belonged to the organized, but emotionally unstimulated and intellectual, discipline of the two English or even the four Scottish universities.

To us, in the twentieth century, the "Socialist" and "Utopian" philosophic economics of Owen and Hodgskin, in that short outburst of intellectual fertility, seem as important as those of Ricardo and McCulloch, and Maltnus, and the other "classical" economists who were stirred by the same social events. But the "classical" writers guided for two generations the main stream of British economic policy, and the treatises of their opponents remained as dusty and forgotten pamphlets, to be rediscovered a third of a century later by Karl Marx in the British Museum, and collected by university librarians today (6).

The classical economists were Utilitarian in their psychological assumptions. Like Bentnem, they looked for a standard external to the feelings of those responsible for social judgment; and believed that they had found that standard by "extending the experimental method of reasoning from the physical branch to the moral." Ricardo's "Law of Rent," Maltnus' "Law of Population," and McCulloch's "Law of Wages," were intended to be used by statesmen and industrialists as the laws of physics were used by James Watt or Humphry Davy. But, as soon as the economists and their disciples began to apply those laws to actual economic problems, they were faced, as Carlyle and J.S.Mill were faced, in their attempt to reach a consistent philosophic position, with the fact that they were dealing with men and women and children, and not with Watt's engines or Hobbes' falling stones. The spinners and the "little piecers" in the cotton factories, and the pauper laborers in the villages were not merely passive illustrations of economic laws, but sentient beings who felt real pains and real joys. Again, because men are more or less "social" animals, their pains and joys affected other human beings as well as themselves, and were "ends" as well as means (7)

CLASSES AND CLASS STRUGGLE

Now that we have covered, in a very cursory manner, the history of philosophic and psychological thought on the matter of wealth and group consciousness and man's painful groping (mentally) after security and happiness, I feel we are in a position to deal with the subject proper, classes and class struggle. It is a part of the economic interpretation of history to hold that, since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, social processes have inevitably grouped men in economic classes. An economic class is an aggregate of persons whose occupation has the same bearing on the supply of things wanted by mankind, and who, in that occupation, sustain the same relation toward other persons. Or, in other words, it is an aggregate of persons whose specific economic functions and interests are similar, and who, therefore, bear a common relation to the prevailing economic system. In all communities of persons who produce goods for individual profit, there exists, necessarily, an antagonism of material interests. The persons may have like "general" interests; as consumers they will want goods at low prices; they may equally desire peace, prosperity, and health; they may have equal interest in salubrity of climate and fertility of soil. But their "particular" interests vary and conflict in accord with the different methods by which the individuals secure their living. The diversity and antagonism of kinds of interest and function determine class divisions.

The Civil War was prompted by a sectional interest and that, in turn, was based on an economic interest (1). Moreover, as between the controlling forces on each side it was, in the main, a class conflict. But, within each of the two warring sections, were widely separated economic classes whose boundaries and relations (except those of the slaves) remained unaltered by the struggle.

In no other instance, perhaps, in modern times, have classes with interests so fundamentally opposed as were those of the various Southern classes made common cause in the great war; and the truth embodied in the adage, "This is a rich man's war, but a poor man's fight," was gradually driven home to the consciousness of every intelligent poor man who bore his part in that conflict. I do not feel the majority, as yet, fully realize the late World War was, more or less, of the same nature.

We must remember that Class membership is based on similarity of specific functions and interests. But the units of a class may be engaged in a great diversity of occupations. Baker and compositor, iron-moulder and carpenter, are alike units of the class of wage-earning producers. Their specific function, despite the varying technique of their labor, is that of producing goods for wages; their specific interests are alike, and they bear a like relation to the economic system. All owners of the tools of production used by other men are of one class; all self-employing producers are of another. So too, all slaves, whether men employed in picking cotton, or women employed in nursing their master's children, were of the same class. Whatever the nature of their toil, whatever the degree of trust in which they were held by their owners, they were alike in that they had common interests, a common function in doing what they were bid, and a common relation of absolute dependence.

The earliest appearance of an economic class is in the form of slavery (2). Under pure savagery slavery is but rare and incidental; it is possible, and perhaps probable, that slave classes begin to appear with the conquest of peoples who developed tribal industries - that is, the craft of making some

one product in which all the working members of a tribe engage. A tribe skilled in a certain craft is conquered by a rival tribe, covetous of its products, and is henceforth compelled to produce for its conquerors. Tribal industries appear at a very early time in the history of mankind, certainly as early as the period of so-called "hoe-culture." With the subsequent development of agriculture comes the need of workers in the fields; and other adjacent tribes are conquered and enslaved. Classes also arise under the division of labor consequent upon the growth of individual industry and the accumulation of property; but this is indisputably a later process, requiring a more peaceful and stable society, as I have attempted to show in the first section of this paper. Classes are thus formed under either peace or war, in the former case through the accumulation of individual property, in the latter case through tribal or racial conquest. Whenever these conquests occurred among post-primitive tribes, they usually resulted in a more or less complete subjection of the defeated (3). Whatever the previous gradation of classes among the vanquished, the quartering upon them of a new ruling class generally meant an almost uniform levelling to the status of slavery, serfdom, or peasanthood. Such a conquest, for instance, was that of the English Saxons by William of Normandy. "Within the lifetime of William....two of his sons ....and the nominal reign of Stephen," writes Cheney, "the whole body of the nobility, the bishops and abbots, and the government officials had come to be of Norman or other continental origin."(4) (An Introduction to the Industrial and Social History of England, by Cheney. P.10). Even the architects and skilled artisans, and perhaps most of the merchants, were Normans. The great body of the Anglo-Saxons had been reduced, for the time

being, to the status of an inferior class.

But, in later times, coincident with the firmer establishment of political states and the development of more stable forms of industry, conquest has affected classes less and less. Even the many conquests in feudal times for the most part merely supplanted one set of rulers by another, effecting by taxation or tribute the exploitation of the defeated, and leaving the serfs, tenants, and overseers, who escaped death in their former tenures and employments. And, as feudalism passed away, and a new form of production arose, these classes were naturally transformed to meet new needs. There is thus traceable, in the more civilized lands, but particularly in England and Germany, where economic development has proceeded along comparatively regular lines, a historic continuity of classes. "Out of the slave classes, as it was organized by the Romans in the countries subject to the Empire," writes Ingram,(5) ("Slavery",Enclya,Brita.), "the modern proletariat has been historically evolved." From villeins to peasants, from retainers to professional men, is a common and discernable evolution, There are breaks in the process, it is true, due to the rise or fall of individuals from one class to another; to the expansion of industry, which has created entirely new classes, and to the overrunning of communities and sections by hordes of alien workers, displacing the resident workers. But, as under a particular form of production, the position of a class in its relation to the other strata of society, remains generally constant; so, too,(allowing for such modifying factors as displacement due to capitalist concentration and alien immigration, and the freer opportunities common to new countries), does its hereditary personnel. The children take up the work of their fathers and carry it on to the next

generation; and, though the son of a physician becomes a civil engineer or a lawyer, the son of a baker becomes a shoemaker or bookbinder, while troops of boys from the towns and country flock to industrial positions in the cities, yet the general vocational class of the great mass of fathers and sons remains the same.

Even in America, desite its comparatively brief history, its less regular economic conditions, and its constant influx of immigrants (until recently), the evidences of class heredity are abundant. Let one take, for instance, any stable community in the Middle West, where the refinement of modern industrial processes has not yet caused a wholesale expropriation of the "middle class," and compare its character today with that of twenty or thirty years ago (the State of Ohio is a good example), he will find that, though the population has undergone considerable change, and though the variety and number of occupations have greatly increased (until the height of the present depression), yet the farmers of today are, in large part, the sons or grandsons, or other heirs, of the farmers of yesterday, and that the mercantile, professional, and even artisan and laboring classes show a like heredity of vocation. That individual exceptions, due sometimes to signal ability, but more often to chance, are many, isnot to be disputed; but they are rare compared with the instances that make the rule (6).

A. Class Instinct.

Out of class interest and function develops class instinct (habit-reflexes would perhaps be a better or more exact term than instinct). It manifests itself in like feelings and actions under like conditions of employment (7). However isolated from his class fellows the individual may be, he sees, thinks,

and feels, regarding his more immediate concerns, as his class interest and functions determine; and the color and direction given by his primary interests tinge and direct his beliefs and influence his actions in most other matters. Some scholars have distinguished self-interest from class-interest, and each of these from national interest or patriotism. The first two, however, though apparently distinct, are readily resolvable into an obverse and reverse of the same thing. Class interest is but another aspect of self-interest, having its base in the same desires and needs. Primarily, the human struggle isone for individual advantage. But, since there are obvious limitations to the extent to which individuals can assert themselves, they instinctively develop the practice of acting in unison with certain others of like conditions and having the same needs. And asindustry becomes differentiated, and particular groups develop more specialized functions, the same sense of similar interests and practice of like functions create a more specialized set of feelings and beliefs which all share (8). In times of slavery, the general mass of masters hold one set of ideas of what is right, and what they propose to enforce, while the general mass of slaves have another set of standards and purposes. Under feudalism, the uppper classes view matters in one way, while the villeins view matters in quite another. Under the present capitalist system, employers of necessity agree with one another in certain standards of action and a certain common will, while on the other hand, employees as inevitably rally around a quite different set of feelings and convictions. These feelings and convictions are not temperamental; they are not even necessarily reasoned. They are the mental reflexes produced by functions and interests. They are not fixed in

the mental fibre of the individual, for the individual shifts his beliefs when he passes from one class to another (9). As a laborer, he views industrial problems in one light; good wages, short hours and, if a union man, the mutual recognition of the smallest and pettiest details of shop work are to him almost the elemental principles of a religion. But, when he becomes an employer, that which had before seemed to him just, comes often to be regarded as unjust and even grotesque. He has suffered no change in moral integrity, no impairment of judgment; yet suddenly he has found hollow and meaningless that which was before almost axiomatic. It is his new interests which dominate him - new interests arising out of new methods of making a living, andit is almost inevitable that such interests, based on such profound needs as the maintenanceof life, should endow him with new beliefs and standards of conduct. These interests are the basis of his class feeling and his class attitude.

B. Class Consciousness:

It must not be thought, however, that because men develop class instinct and class feeling they necessarily develop class consciousness. The consciousness of class follows haltingly and tardily the instinct of class interests. A non-inion workman, for instance, looks at questions of wages and hours from the standpoint of a workman; he wants high wages if he can get them; short hours, healthful conditions; and whatever ethical standards he develops arise out of his status as a worker. But he is almost wholly devoid of class consciousness. Possibly he considers himself a worker for the time only, and expects by some wondrous transformation to become an employer; or, possibly, his understanding is too narrow to entertain any conception of classes. At

any rate, he cannot see, or refuses to see, that his interests are bound up in those of his fellows. He fails utterly to comprehend that what is one wage-earner's gain or loss, as a wage-earner, is potentially, and in the long run, the gain or loss of all other men in that class.

It is this fact of the slow growth of class consciousness among the producers that has made them so long the prey of exploiting classes. The union workman (craft-unionism) has developed this consciousness of class, imperfectly though it may be (10) and, in turn, strives to awaken it in his more dormant brothers. The rapidity of its growth depends largely on the nearness of the benefits to be gained by its assertion. Thus, the union workman reaches his partial class consciousness by a sense of the immediate benefit in wages and conditions to be gained by collective bargaining. The fuller class consciousness involved in the concept of collective action by the whole class of producers for the gaining of approximately the entire product of their labor, is more tardily attained, because benefits promised seem less tangible and more remote. But, with the increasing stress of the class struggle, the consciousness of class gradually awakens in the minds of an increasing number of the participants, and manifests itself in a more united and determined assertion of their varying claims.

C. Class Hatred:

Congenital optimists, as well as other conservatives of various kinds, are very fond of charging social agitators with attempting to develop classes by appealing to class hatred. But it is overlooked that this allegation is in itself an acknowledgment of the existence of classes. Without classes, there can obviously be no such thing as class hatred. Moreover, this

allegation refers to the fostering of hatred among workmen for their capitalist masters; i.e., William Randolph Hearst. By what means has been developed the responsive hatred by the masters of the men, of which such striking examples have recently been given by the public representatives (particularly in our State officers)(11) of the militant employer's organizations, is not disclosed. It should be remembered, further, that with the development of industry in times of peace, classes arise long before there is any awakening of class hatred; and, finally, that an inferior class may be so benumbed by oppression, or so cajoled or wheedled as to acquiesce in its wrongs and to reverence its oppressors. The reason for class hatred among normal men is the sense of economic exploitation, with its almost inevitable resultant of a sense of social inferiority.

The cause of class hatred lies in the relation that one class sustains to another. The counterpart of hatred is contempt, and where there is one class in society that looks down upon another as its inferior, there will be another class in society which will respond to that look with hatred. For contempt is not passive; it is active and, at the heart of much of the injustice history has been compelled to record. The men who look upon their fellow-men as inferior, as possessing no rights worthy of respect, will seek opportunities to infringe those rights, to take advantage of the inferior strength or position of others, and when one class is in a position in which it is able to wrong another class, and does it, that other class will hate the first class (12). Doubtless there are social agitators who are man of bitter temperaments and who make their appeal to hatred. But bitter temperaments are confined to no class. They are, as a matter of fact, if one may

judge of the character of a class by the expressions of its most eminent representatives, quite as frequently found in the upper as in the lower divisions. Insistence upon the fact of classes, and attempts to develop the class consciousness of the workers, are not of themselves manifestations of hatred. Take England as an example, a country that makes no pretense of denying class divisions (13). The essential first step toward future harmony is to understand the causes of the present discord. Only by a thorough recognition of the character and causes of class divisions can the material factors compelling those divisions be abolished, and the ground be prepared for a complete and abiding social unity. To blame those who point out the fact of classes (Socialists and Communists, as well as advocates of the Social Gospel) and the class struggle is futile, and the passion that prompts such blame is as senseless and barbaric as was that of the Oriental kings of old who slew the messengers of ill tidings.

D. Class Ethics:

A set of ethical notions, a code of ethical precepts, based on particular modes of industry, or service, or other means of income, develops in each class; and the conscience of the individual, plastic to this material pressure sanctions the acts which are supposedly needful for self-advantage. Financier, retainer, social servant, producer, trader - each of these has his specific code. Among these codes there are certain general resemblances, since all develop under the same system of production and distribution, and since all those of the subordinate classes are influenced more or less by the code which the ruling class always seeks to impose. But they differ in special features in accord with the necessary antagonisms of class interest and function (14).

Class differences do not, as it is hardly necessary to admit, explain all human antagonisms. Many of these are based on ideological factors, and though such factors may, in turn, generally be traced to material bases, they may conveniently be considered, for any particular time and place, as truly ideological.

Society has become differentiated, not only into economic classes, but into political states and religious sects; and this differentiation has brought about a complex web of interests and a consequent complexity of ethical standards. The average man acts, under certain circumstances with regard to his religion, under other circumstances with regard to his state, or government,or political party. But it is his primary interest - his interest connected with the economic class to which he belongs - which determines the general cast of his thinking, which modifies or even entirely negatives his acceptance of the ethical code embodied in his professed religion, and which determines the general range and character of his actions.

The storekeeper, for instance, may be a Catholic, Protestant, Jew, or Agnostic. He may be Republican, Democrat, or Socialist. But it is not observable that these idealogical differences cause any striking dissimilarities in his methods of carrying on business. If cheaper prices and better merchandise are to be found in stores where Gamaliel or Hillel, rather than John Calvin,or Pius X, or Thomas Paine is reverenced, the fact beats but small relation to the religious or philosophical creed of the trader. Class interest and function determine his business conduct and the slight differences discoverable in the mode are traceable only to the personal equation - to differences in forethought, energy, and skill in bargaining. Further, it

must be said that the larger creeds themselves take on a hue and character determined by the prevailing form of production and the nature of class relations; and that whatever claim for these creeds - of divine origin, of universal applicability, of immutable validity - they change inevitably from age to age in accord with their economic environment (15).

How has it happened that, despite the eternal warfare of communities and classes, ethical codes intended for universal application have been formulated and insistently preached, we need not here discuss. It is certain that, for more than two millenniums philosophers, teachers of religion, and others somewhat removed from the pressure of the class struggle, have sought to instil into mankind a more perfect ethics, a moral code uncircumscribed by sectional interest. But, though the effect of such teaching has been a modification to some slight extent of the fratricidal struggle among mankind, the ideal sought is an utter futility so long as individualist competition for the means of life, however altered or refined, continues. That mode of production and distribution compels the segregation of men into classes and the waging of a class struggle for the means of life, and that struggle determines the ethical concepts and practices of the combatants.

The beliefs which a class holds, as a result of its economic relations, are generally sincere beliefs and are held, in the main, unconsciously of their determining cause. There is a spiritual alchemy which transmutes the base metal of self-interest into the gold of conscience; the transmutation is real, and the resulting frame of mind is not hypocrisy, but conscience. It is a class conscience, and therefore partial and imperfect, having little to do with absolute ethics. But partial and imperfect as it is, it is

generally sincere. It is most obviously so among those of the two extreme classes who battle for advantage from such opposite bases. Members of the same community, of the same political party, perhaps of the same secret society, taught by the same teachers, informed by the same newspapers, enrolled (let us imagine) in the same church, the employer and the employee will yet differ diametrically on ethical questions of material interest, and do it honestly. For the code of each is based upon things more fundamental than ideas or sentiments. It is based upon economic life.

But the class conscience may also be honest in the person of the social servant who, blind to his real mission and his right function, preaches or teaches the class ethics of the rulers as a social code obligatory upon all. When, for example, a respected expounder of the creed of the Nazarene carpenter tells the public with solemn face that the great enemies of the freedom of the country are those who would forbid a man to sell his labour for such price as he is compelled to accept - in brief, the craft-unionists - the statement is, or may be, a conscientious judgment. Such a teacher may be honest; he may really believe this to be a self-sustaining proposition; he may be quite unconscious that the main cause of his holding this belief is the fact that he never was a producer, never had any consciousness of the pressing needs of the producers as a class, and therefore never had any of the kind of ethical feeling which that consciousness produces.

Such a teacher is a retainer, even if an unconscious one; and it is his retainer conscience which finds quick and sharp expression when he sees the "liberty" of the one man interfered with in behalf of the interests of the group of which that man is a part. His conscience, a reflex of the

trader conscience, cannot interpret liberty in any other than the negative, eighteenth-century sense, because so interpreted and actualized, it best accords with the interests of the employing class. Such a conscience cannot understand by the term, the "positive power or capacity," which each man exercises or holds through the help or security given him by his fellow-men, and which he in turn helps to secure for them. All that such a conscience understands by the term in this connection, is a vague harmony with a nebulous principle learned in earlier days (16). That actually the term means, in this application, the potential license of the industrial freebooter to drag down the whole body of wage-earners by working for less wages and under meaner conditions than will satisfy the rest, does not penetrate the retainer conscience. His belief is a class belief, arising out of his manner of earning a living, which involves a greater or less assimilation of trading-class views of life.

And yet it must be said that it requires a certain strain upon the ordinary usage of words to describe such teaching as "honest." A capitalist might conscientiously hold that low wages, long hours, child labour, unguarded machinery, the open shop, unrestricted output, and Chinese or Mexican immigration are all for the best interests of the state. They are, or are conceived to be, for his own best interests with those of society at large, as he really does, it is entirely possible that he should hold to such anti-social views. Thank goodness this philosophy is rapidly disappearing. The mass of capitalists in every decade of the past century, bitterly fought the state's increasing assumption of control over industry in behalf of the helpless; did it as they are trying to do it today, with candor and sincerity,

with a belief that the special interests of business were the most vital interests of society, and that therefore they were to be fostered, even though human lives were snuffed out by the thousands in all the mines and workshops of the land. But the minister, the teacher, or the writer professes a social service. He assumes an attitude beyond and above the special interests of class. Rightly, it may be said that it is to his economic interest to preach and teach the special ethics of the traders; that the good jobs go to those who are most eloquent, insistent, and thorough-going in expounding such ethics, while the poorer jobs, or no jobs at all, go to those who are most backward or slow-witted in such exposition (1/). But for all that, such teaching is a contradiction of his professed mission. His tacit contract with society obliges him to serve as a disseminator of learning, or as a stimulator of social virtues. Generally, he is a man of education and experience. He has eaten of the tree of knowledge and knows, or ought to know, good from evil. When, therefore, he serves merely as a reflector of upper-class ethics, as an encourager of profit-hunger and a suborner of treachery and betrayal among the working class, he perverts his <u>contractual function to society</u>.

In every age he has, as a general thing, discharged just this subservient class function. Whatever the form of his religious or philosophical creed, he has moulded his hortatory ethics to the fashion of the special requirements of the dominant class. In particular times, when great social and industrial movements, making for revolutionary changes in conditions have been under way, the conduct of this group has sometimes borne the appearance of wholesale prostitution. Let one take, for instance, the well known period of agitation

for the education and factory acts in England. The rise of manufacturing interests brought forth a swarm of economists, ministers, and other publicists, the general mass of whose teaching was a pure reflex of the code developed by the factory lords. Though the unspeakable horrors of factory life at the time were known far and wide, the instructors of the people were almost a unit against interference, and it was only through the intervention of the landed aristocracy, a class jealous of the manufacturers, that a change was brought about. The economists, whom Sadler, the Tory leader, described as "the pests of society and the persecutors of the poor," were nearly all, with the exception of Malthus and McCulloch, bitterly hostile to the factory acts (18) ("The Utilitarians," by Leslie Stephen, vol. iii, pp. 172-176). It was Nassau W. Senior, the first professor of political economy at Oxford, who discovered in 1836, for the benefit of the Manchester(19) manufacturers, that all factory profits were made in the last hour of the working day; and that the reduction of the day (then eleven and a half hours long) by this one hour would paralyze the great industries of England ("Capital", by Marx, ch.9, sec.3). The list of publicists who opposed these humane and necessary acts includes Bright, Cobden, Bowring, Roebuck, and Joseph Hume. Even so just a man as John Stuart Mill, though he could recognize the pressure of the upper-class morality on the subordinate classes, was himself sufficiently under the spell to oppose the factory acts except as to the provisions relating to children.

The Vicars of the Churches were, for the most part, in the same class. Certain clergy of the High Church faction spoke out for the factory victims, but the evangelicals, non-conformists, and independents generally sided with

the factory lords. "Shaftsbury complained that he could not get the evangelicals to take up the factory movement. They had been the mainstay of the anti-slavery movement, but they did not seem to be troubled about white slavery. The reason, no doubt, was obvious; the evangelicals were mainly of the middle class, and class prejudices were too strong for the appeals to religious principles."(20) (Stephen, vol.iii,p.178).

A like attitude, a reflex of the upper-class attitude, was taken by the great mass of the instructors of the public during the early period of the movement for an education act. Here, however, the Utilitarian economists were at loggerheads with the publicists. For, while they could look philosophically upon the worse than Herodian slaughter of the innocents in the factories, they could yet stand for certain provisions for the education of the masses. But the non-Utilitarian publicists were, for the most part, antagonistic, and though the Whitbread bill was introduced in 1807, it was not until the Reform bill(1832) that even the beginnings of national aid in education could be carried against this opposition, and until 1870 that anything approaching an adequate act was passed. The distinguished clergyman and educator, Dr. Andrew Bell, could write in explanation of the plea that the Whitbread bill was not revolutionary or dangerous:" It is not proposed that the children of the poor be educated in an expensive manner, or even taught to write and cipher.... There is a risk of elevating, by an indiscriminate education, the minds of those doomed to the drudgery of daily labor above their condition, and thereby rendering them discontented and unhappy in their lot. It may suffice to teach the generality, on an economical plan, to read their Bibles and understand the doctrines of our holy religion."

The famous writer and cleric, Hannah More, considered a radical in her day, also illustrates the temper of her class by her declaration that "she wished the poor to be able to read their Bibles and to be qualified for domestic duties, but not to be able to write or to be enabled to read Tom Paine, or to be encouraged to rise above their position." And the great literary light of the Whigs, Dr. Parr, argued "that the poor ought to be taught, but admitted that the enterprise had its limits. The Deity Himself had fixed a great gulf between them(selves) and the poor."(21)(Stephen,vol.1, p.111).

All this was of England, says the patriotic American, and did not and could not have happened in our own land. True, but if the exhortations of the earlier American preachers and publicists reveal less opposition to factory acts than did those of their English brethren, or contemporaries, it is for the excellent reason that there was no factory-reform movement for them to oppose, and that was because there were few or no factories. And if, again, they were more favourable to popular education than were their English contemporaries, it was because, among other things, the weaker organization of industry in America did not necessitate, or seem to necessitate the existence of a large class of illiterate and helpless proletarians. The peculiarly individualistic structure of American industrial society in the earlier days, wherein every unit was a possible competitor with every other, made the equipment of at least a moderate education a valuable asset both to the individual and the nation. The ruling class, who at first were the landed aristocracy, and at a later time a junta of tradesmen and planters, saw no particular harm, and perhaps some good, in education for the masses, and

(at least after Jefferson's time) did not generally oppose it; and the instructors of the people, under no spell of adverse influence from above, for the time being maintained a true social service and heartily supported universal education.

The first factory reform agitation in the United States was coincident with the first working-class movement, roughly from 1826 to 1834. It received no aid whatever so far as is now known, from the class of persons here designated as social servants. The movement of 1841 to 1848, however, was led by certain members of this class. It began in a blaze of sentiment, and died out when that sentiment was exhausted. It marked the one time in the history of our people when a considerable number of the class of social servants allied themselves openly and enthusiastically with the cause of the workers. If, in any time when the issue was sharply defined, they have stood, as a class, for neither workers nor employers, but for an ideal embracing the interests of all society, the precise period is not ascertainable. In practically all times the natural promptings arising from the nature of their function, have been overborne by the pressure of ruling-class influence.

The existence of classes here in America (republic though it is) is often indignantly denied. But upon what valid grounds the denial is made would be difficult to discover. Industrial evolution has resulted in a vast differentiation in kinds of employment, and it has amplified and extended the fundamental differences in the relations of men to production itself and to the system of production. The relations of the toolless employee and of the factory-owning employer to the product of any particular shop are widely distinct; and throughout all society there exists a gradation of groups of

men with varying relations to one another, to a particular product, and to production as a whole. Professor Ely, in his book, "Studies in the Evolution of Industrial Society," frankly concedes the fact of classes in America, briefly explaining their genesis and development: "We have groups of individuals who possess common characteristics. They have their own peculiar habits of body and of mind, and their peculiar needs. The farmer has his own way of looking at things, the merchant another way. The wage-earner, especially as he develops, as he is doing, class-consciousness, has still other ways of doing things and viewing affairs. The chief classification in our own day is that which is caused, on the one hand, by variations of wealth, and, on the other, by a separation between the employed and the employers." (pp.84-85). Even the most blissful of the social unitarians - the deniers of class and the asserters of economic and social unity under private capital (though few in numbers today, laus Deo) will hardly allege that domestic servants and, let us say, bankers belong to the same economic division. Nor will any except a few sentimentalists and parasites, who delight in reiterating the empty phrase that "the interests of capital and labor are identical," maintain that the same economic group may comprise both boilermakers and railroad presidents. Between lawyers and farmers, miners and stockbrokers, lie equal differences of function, interest, and relationship, and no torturing of the obvious facts can transmute such diversities into likenesses. These differences are the basis of class groupings.

The unequal distribution of income and wealth renders absurd all capitalist society's pretensions to democracy and equality. It sticks like a

bone in the throat. And it threatens to choke capitalism, for the unequal distribution arises out of and aggravates all the maladjustments and disturbances of capitalist production.

Although the concentration of income and wealth has become constantly greater, many capitalist apologists have always insisted that it was breaking down. This was one of the claims of the pre-1929 "new capitalism." The logic of the illogical assumption that the policy of increasingly higher wages was accepted by the employers, led the prophets of the "new capitalism" to insist: That, in the words of President Calvin Coolidge, "the results of prosperity are going more and more into the homes of the land and less into the enrichment of the few" (22) (New York Times,May 21,1927). That, consequently, the distribution of income and wealth was becoming more equal, more democratic: the indubitable proof of which, according to capitalists, being the "enormous" increase of "mass" participation in stock ownership.

While some capitalist apologists, contrary to the facts, have insisted that the distribution of income was becoming more equal, others, much to the chagrin of their contemporaries, have used economic theory to justify the existing unequal distribution. It was assumed that "fixed natural laws" determined distributive shares, according to productive function performed. The theory was fundamental in the system of the American economist, John Bates Clark: "There are fixed laws of distribution which society is not at liberty to violate....Where natural laws have their way, the share of income that attaches to any productive function, is gauged by the actual product of it.....Wages are the whole product of labor....Every laborer is

paid the exact equivalent of what he produces and capital receives the exact equivalent of what it produces....Natural law, so far as it has its way, excludes all spoilation" (23) (Quot. Paul T. Homan, "Contemporary Economic Thought," 1928, pp.27,59).

The animus is clear...the same animus of the efforts to disprove the Marxist theory of value by means of the subjective theory of marginal utility is now discredited; labor is not necessarily exploited under the social relations of capitalist production, and its share of the national income, however small, is fixed, natural, and just.

A variant of the "fixed shares" theory is the law formulated by Vilfredo Pareto, the philosopher of Fascism, that income distribution is essentially the same in all countries and at all times. Analysis has demonstrated, however, that the law is mathematically inaccurate and statistically disprovable. It is also disproved by Pareto's Italy, where, since the advent of Fascism, the unequal distribution of income has become more unequal.

These theories rest on the assumption, unreal and apologetic, of an economic order based on "natural law, in which the free play of economic forces assures functional harmony and the "larger good." But there is no such order. Let me quote from Lewis Corey '24) (Decline of American Capitalism, p.505): "Economic forces are not eternal, they are historical. They work, not in an unreal world of "natural law," but in the midst of class rule and exploitation, of social-economic change and conflict which affect the movement of economic forces, including the distribution of income. The only "eternal" aspect of income is that, under a system of private property

and class rule, its distribution must be unequal, with the producers getting the smallest share. There are long-time movements and short-time fluctuations, but concentration of income always tends upward." It is suggestive that engineers, who think they have a "new" approach to economics, merely vulgarize the older unreal concepts. Thus the Technocrats emphasize price, in the manner of the most extreme price economists, but with a slant of their own. Another engineer economist swallows Pareto's law: "Competition has always distributed incomes according to some sort of a probability curve .....In the same way we could express the probability that any molecule in a mass of gas would have any one of various velocities....In any particular nation and at any particular stage of social progress the distribution appears to have a certain normal form about which it fluctuates but toward which it always tends to return. In fact, the general form of this normal distribution probably has not changed greatly throughout history"(25) (H.C.Dickinson, "The Mechanics of Recovery," Journal of the Society of Automotive Engineers, Feb.1933,p.2). Dickinson, who thinks the economic system "is a mechanism, a machine," argues that its "instability can be controlled through adjustments of the mechanism itself without disturbing the present competitive economic system." But the instability is a result of the working of the capitalist system itself. And the "adjustments" needed are not mechanical; they are social, involving class interests and class conflicts. This angle meets the engineer at every turn. How often is he thwarted in the mechanical, functional approach toward the construction of, say, machines and bridges, by the pressure of capitalist profit and vested interests. How often is his suggestion for the installation of safety devices rejected because of their

cost! How little attention is paid to his arguments that technology is capable of providing plenty for all!

Capitalism augments the unequal distribution of income. One of the most competent investigators of the subject writes: "General historical knowledge would lead one to infer numerically the income inequality must have beensmaller in pre-capitalist Europe than at present, if only for the reason that incomes were then absolutely lower and that the lower limit of incomes is more rigid than the upper....In those countries in which personal distribution of income has been measured for some time past, the preponderance of evidence is toward increasing inequality of incomes"(26)(Simon Kuznets,"National Income," Encly.of Social Sciences,v.vi,p.396). In the earlier stages of capitalism there was a broadening of income concentration at the top of the social pyramid, because of the emergence of rich bourgeois merchants and speculators; but concentration was increased relatively to the mass of the people, and kept on increasing. The curve of income distribution in capitalist society is not constant; its upward movement and fluctuations profoundly affect social-economic maladjustments and disturbances.

In the colonial and early national periods of the United States, the unequal distribution of income, largely because of an agrarian economy, was not great, although increasing. It increased tremendously during the Civil War, because of the growth of industrial capitalism and particularly of speculation. A slight downward tendency was apparent from 1870 on; but this was temporary and was accompanied by a multiplication of millionaires, 4000 in 1892 compared with probably 500 in 1860(27) (Lewis Corey, "Fortunes, Private:Modern",Encycl.Social Sciences,v.vi,p.396).

Concentration thereafter grew swiftly, in the period of relative economic decline; the share of the national income received by the richest 1.6% of the population rose from 10.8% in 1896 to 19.% in 1909 (28) (Bureau of Internal Revenue, "Statistics of Income,"1916,p.28), an increase of nearly 100%. In the early years of the World War concentration mounted to new heights; incomes of $100,000 up rose from 2,290 in 1914 to 6,633 in 1916, a year of extraordinary profits nourished by speculation and the butchery of European peoples.

CONCLUSION

Economic forces - institutions and their idealogy - are interlocked with the class relations of society. In any society based on private property, the relations of production mean the domination of a particular class ruling over the classes. Economic contradictions and antagonisms, and economic development in general, are expressed in class interests and class struggles. The focal point of the class struggle is in the state to decide the issues created by class-economic contradictions and antagonisms. Neither economics nor politics are intelligible without reference to class relations and the balance of class power.

In "normal" times, the class struggle is comparatively peaceful and the struggle for power mainly potential. The ruling class is solidly entrenched in the state, supported by all the institutional and idealogical relations arising out of the existing order. It may be forced to make temporary or minor concessions; but this is compatible with the continuance and consolidation of its power for three reasons; the ruling class still represents at least the possibility of economic progress and, by and large, still

"delivers the goods," its concessions blunt the edge of opposition and strengthen its institutional and idealogical supports, and the ruled classes are neither desperate enough nor conscious enough to initiate a revolutionary struggle for power. When American capitalism was on the upswing, the struggles of the agrarian, middle class, and labor radicals were easily smothered by a policy of concessions and suppression and the hope of better things. But this has its limits. While the ruling class is strengthened, it is at the same time undermined by the social-economic forces which eventually produce a crisis of the system. Dominant institutional and ideological relations begin to crumble. The ruling class no longer represents even the possibility of economic progress; it no longer "delivers the goods." Hope of better things is replaced by bitter disillusion. Concessions are more difficult to make and do not satisfy, for they are limited by economic decline and the interests of the ruling class. Class struggles become more intense and explosive, more conscious of goals and means. As classes mobilize and right, issues are clarified. The struggle for power becomes the order of the day, for it is now clear that the real struggle is between the old order and the new, and their class representatives; i.e., in contemporary society, capitalism, and socialism, the capitalist class and the working class. This struggle absorbs all other issues and classes.

I agree with Lewis Corey in his rather noted book, "The Decline of American Capitalism," when he states that the emerging struggle for power is being shaped by the following three developments: (29)

1. "The cyclical crisis; its unprecedented severity, bound up with an important qualitative change in the character of depression with profoundly disturbed institutional and ideological relations.

2. "The crisis of prosperity; the inability to restore prosperity on

any considerable scale, with its terrible consequences in unemployment, lower standards of living, and the resort to imperialism and war, means that the institutional and ideological disturbances of the depression will be transformed into sharper and more conscious class struggle.

5. "The crisis of the capitalist system; Both the severity of the depression and the inability to restore prosperity on any considerable scale are aspects of the decline of capitalism. Capitalist relations are no longer compatible with the development of the forces of production, they now mean an absolute limitation of production. This clearly reveals the transitory, the relative historical character of the capitalist mode of production. It is a crisis of the system itself, whose only possible outcome is socialism or a socialized state or economic and cultural decay." Despite the fact apologists insist that revolution is alien to the traditions of the American people, the decline of American capitalism and its class-ideological crisis have set in motion the forces preparing for a new America, the coming revolution.

Revolution has played a decisive part in American development. Colonial migrations were thrust forth by the developing bourgeois revolution in Europe and its transformation of the old feudal order. Some of the most fundamental and uncompromising aspects of the revolution were represented by the Puritan settlers. Their ideals of individual and social freedom, created in the struggle against the old order, were progressive in spite of their theological forms and class limitations. Many Puritan sects broke through the limitations and urged equalitarian democratic reforms, including in some cases

ownership of property in common. Colonial class struggles produced several minor revolts. The bourgeoisie secured its independence of Britain by means of revolution, and sounded the tocsin for the French Revolution of 1789. The revolutionary bourgeoisie organized itself as a practical dictatorship. Nor was it bothered by the fact that it represented a militant minority only, for roughly two-thirds of the people were either indifferent or actively antagonistic: the opposition was violently coerced, where necessary, and Loyalists were expropriated. "Tom Paine and Sam Adams were professional revolutionists who deliberately andconsciously planned the revolution through years of agitation and organization"(30) (cf.Philip G. Davidson, "America Historical Review," April,1934,p.443).

After independence was secured, the French Revolution became an ideological rallying force in the American struggle between the "masses" and the "classes." The new republic encouraged revolutions in South America, declared it would oppose European efforts to restore or extend colonial rule, and became the refuge of political exiles. I shall not go into the details of the Civil War in this respect. Suffice it to say that I do not feel the American temperament has changed so drastically, in view of our attitude and response to so-called patriotism and bally-hoo during the last War to encourage anyone to think a Revolution in America is impossible. Revolutions are inevitable. That is the conclusion of a bourgeois student of the "natural history" of revolution. Social-economic and class forces develop to a point where sharp revolutionary break becomes necessary. The conclusion is thus amplified: "This country, in common with all others in which the industrial revolution has developed, is destined to evolve through capitalism into some

sort of social control of industry....A laboring man of today is a person still insignificant compared with the capitalist. But, through the agency of his organization, he is superior to the farmer. The laboring man seems destined to be the ruler of the future....We may take it for granted that revolution, even violent revolutions (not simply mental revolution) will occur periodically for a long time to come. We hear some talk of substituting peaceable evolution for violent revolution, but such talk is only what the theologians call "pious opinion," laudable, but imaginative. No technology is being developed for the purpose of translating this talk into action (31) (L.P.Edwards, "The Natural History of Revolution," p.6).

Carrying this bit further, it is good to remember that an epoch is a repertory of positive and negative tendencies; it is a system of subtleties and perspicacities united to a system replete with blindness and dullness. There is not only the taste for certain things, but also the determination to have distaste for others. At the beginning of a new age, the first thing we notice is the magical presence of these negative propensities, which initiate the elimination of the fauna and flora of the anterior epoch; so, in the flight of the swallows and in the fall of the leaves, we first become aware of the presence of autumn.

In this sense there is no better qualification of the age now dawning upon the continent of Europe, as well as that of America, than the recognition that revolutions may appear at any time and in any country. I use the word "revolution," however, following a common custom, calling every collective movement in which violence is employed against established power, a "revolution." We must bear in mind, nevertheless, that the least essential

feature of true revolution is violence. It is not inconceivable, though it is hardly likely, that a revolution might run its whole course without a drop of blood being shed. Revolutions are not constituted by barricades, but by states of mind. History is not content with rough and ready notions. It requires more exact instruments and more sharply outlined concepts for its purpose of sound orientation in the forest of human occurences, than simply one part of society rebelling against the governing class and violently substituting others for them.

It is a remarkable fact that, in all the great historical cycles of which we have sufficient knowledge - the Greek, Roman, and European worlds, for instance - a point is reached at which not one revolution, but a whole revolutionary era begins, which lasts two or three centuries. All revolutions presuppose a peculiar and unmistakable disposition of mind. "The psyche passes from a traditional state of mind to a tationalist and, from the latter, to a mystical regime" (32). "These are, so to speak, the three different forms of psychic mechanism, the three distinct ways in which the mental apparatus of mankind pursues its function" (ibid).

Everyone recognizes that revolutions are not in essence anything but political radicalism. The pure use of the intellect, this thinking more geometrico, is generally called rationalism. Perhaps it would be more enlightening to call it radicalism. Political radicalism is not an original attitude; it is rather a consequence. It is not <u>radical</u> in politics because it is radical in <u>politics</u>, but because it is already radical in thought. This distinction, though it may have a frivolously super-subtle air,

is decisive for the comprehension of the historical phenomenon which is properly styled revolutionary. The desire of the radical (rationalist) temperament is to mould the social body, at all costs, to the pentagraph of concepts framed by pure reason. In the view of the revolutionary, the value of the law is pre-existent to its suitability to life. The good law is good by its own nature, like a pure idea. Now, an idea framed without any other object than that of perfecting it as an idea, however much it may conflict with reality, is precisely what is called Utopia. Accordingly, utopianism is not an affection peculiar to a certain political doctrine, but the character appropriate to what pure reason elaborates. Rationalism, radicalism, and the exercise of thought "more geometrico" are examples of utopianism. The fact is that every revolution cherishes the entirely chimerical object of realizing a more or less complete Utopia. The plan inevitably fails. Its failure creates the twin and antithetical phenomenon of all revolutions; viz., counter-revolution. It would be interesting to prove the latter no less utopian than its antagonist and sister, even when less inspiring, warm-hearted, and intelligent. Enthusiasm for pure reason will not admit defeat and returns to the charge. Another revolution breaks out, and yet another utopia, a modification of the first inscribed upon its banners. There is a fresh failure and a fresh reaction; and so it goes on until the social conscience begins to suspect that the ill-success of these attempts is not due to the intrigues of their enemies, but to the contradictory elements inherent in the objects aimed at. Political ideas lose their glamour and attractive force. All that is facile and puerile in their schematic organization begins to come to light. The utopian program reveals its underlying

formalism, its poverty and aridity, in comparison with the delicious, abundant, and splendid stream of life. The revolutionary era ends very simply, without phrases or gestures, in reabsorption by a new sensibility. To the political philosophy of ideas succeeds a political philosophy of concrete phenomena and men. We discover at last that life does not exist for the benefit of the idea, but that the idea, the institution, the rule, exists for the benefit of life, or, as the Gospel has it, "the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath."

NOTES

Introduction

(1) Canon Dewar has very well expressed what I mean by this statement in his book, "Psychology for Religious Workers," p.70. It is, for example, not a small matter to be fully alive to the existence of what psychologists call, "The tendency to minimum effort" in human nature. This tendency seems to be a survival, in man, of the trial and error method by which the lower animals attempt to solve practical problems. If they are successful, they succeed (like the English), by "muddling through." Owing to this tendency, men's achievements are usually well below their maximum efficiency.

(2) Romans, viii:25.

(3) Cf. Ch.xvi, p.401. "Outline of Psychology," by William McDougall.

(4) Presidential Address, British Association,1922,p.9.

(5) C. Spearman, "Abilities of Man," p.197.

(6) Psychological Section, British Association, 1931, p.190.

(7) "The Mentality of the Apes," S. W. Kohler.

(8) "Who can help seeing that social cohesion is largely due to the necessity for a community to protect itself against others, and that it is primarily as against all other men that we love the man with whom we live?" Henri Bergson, "The Two Sources of Morality and Religion," p.24.

(9) Socrates, who was condemned to death because he did not honor the Gods of the State, is recorded to have declared that he was not an Athenian or a Hellene, but a citizen of the world; and Diogenes,

the Cynic, the predecessor of the Stoics, when asked of what city he was, made the same claim. Zeno himself taught that we should not live in separate cities, but regard all men as fellow-citizens.

(10) New York Times, June 19,1931 (Editorial).

(11) In the Old Testament, Hosea and Jeremiah are good examples.

SECTION 11 - THE ART OF JUDGMENT

(1) Laws, 1,22,58.

(2) I was greatly gratified to hear Arthur Holly Compton,LL.D., Professor of Physics, University of Chicago, in the first of his lectures on the "E.T.Earl Foundation,"(Wheeler Hall, University of California) enlarge upon this very statement of mine. (Jan.20,1936).

(3) Reference, "The Hormic Theory of Human Action Contrasted with Other Theories"("Outline of Psychology," p.213,McDougall).

(4) Republic, Book IV.

(5) Amos shows also a knowledge of the great historical movements, not only of his own, but of other nations. Chs. 1,2,9:7.

(6) The second portion of Hosea, Chs.4-14, consists, under the most vivid imagery, of accusations general and special against Israel for their sins, which the prophet denounces unsparingly; their dishonesty, idolatry, distrust of God, and unwillingness to return to Him.

(7) Amos, Ch.3-6; The iniquities of Israel, the elect people of God (3:2) and the coming punishment of them.

(8) Particularly in the Book of Wisdom, we find in it the doctrine of the world from uncreated matter, of the pre-existence of souls, of the pervading influence of the Divine spirit throughout the universe; but there is no mention of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body (freedom) nor any reference to the regeneration of humanity by the Messiah, while immortality is vividly depicted as the reward and consequence of wisdom (not too much emphasis on the other worldly aspect).

(9) "The Divina Comedia, the religious epic which Dante called a comedy mainly by reason of its style,.....was perhaps suggested by the lovely passage of the Sixth Book of the Aeneid in which Virgil recounts the appearance of Dido to Aeneas as he moves through the underworld of shades..... Among mediaeval poets Dante stands closest to Virgil...(his) allegorizing and uncritical tendency makes much his his epic remote and unobscure to us .....Dante (in common with with Orosius, his master in history) held the view that the Roman Empire was the divinely appointed instrument of government on earth .....(We must remember) Dante was by temperament an aristocrat, by conviction an Imperialist....But in claiming Dante for the aristocrats, the student should remember that to the mind principally occupied with the religious ordering of the universe, the competing claims of class and class which form the matter of political rivalry and meditation, become specks of infinite insignificance. The arbitrament of God which peoples the circles of the Inferno and the Mount of Purgatory and the stars of Paradise talks with equal

hand on prince and ploughman." ("A History of Europe; Ancient and Mediaeval," by H.A.Fisher, pp.291 et seq.).

(10) Ref.Ch.XXX "Critics and Reformers," p.353 et.seq.ibid.

SECTION III - MEDIAEVAL BACKGROUND

(1) Decretum pt.1.

(2) Ibid.

(3) "Summa," Aquinas.

(4) The Bull Unam Sanctam of Boniface VIII.

(5) Editorial, "Does Responsible Ownership Function," New Republic, Apr.21,1926.

(6) The economic contradiction in the movement of production and consumption are necessarily expressed in class antagonisms,

a. Struggle between the workers and employers over wages; while wages may rise absolutely, they always fall relatively to profits.

b. Unequal class distribution of the national income, while the workers' absolute share may rise, their relative share falls, and proletarian consumption always tends toward a minimum.

Conclusion:-Capitalist production, in the epoch of its upswing increases consumption, but mainly among non-workers: economically regardless of who the consumers are, its whole class-political arrangements insure a concentration of consumption gains among the non-workers.

SECTION IV - MODERN THOUGHT ON THE SUBJECT

(1) In the true sense these changes were revolutions. All revolutions, in effect, if they are true revolutions, presuppose a peculiar and unmistakable disposition of mind. Ref. "The Modern Theme," by Jose Ortega y Gasset, supplementary p.99 et.seq. "The Sunset of Revolution."

(2) Again I refer to Dr. Compton in his E.T.Earl Lectures at the Pacific School of Religion,1936.

(3) "It was struggling with the principle of the sovereign rights of nationality that was the prime motive of world policy between the French Revolution and the Great War, and was the cause of forty-four wars between 1815 and 1915. The branch of sovereign nationalism also blossomed from the tree of the Revolution, andwas stronger for a century than the branch of international fraternity. The peoples as nations took over the powers and rivalries which their kings used to display."(The Religious Foundations of Internationalism, by Norman Bentwich,p.136).

(4) Locke classifies his main types of knowledge explicitly into degrees. Of Locke's "degrees of knowledge" the highest, intuition, is alone wholly knowledge; the lowest, judgment, "never amounts to knowledge, no, not to that which is the lowest degree of it;" and the middle, demonstration, is intermediate in degree, showing as it does, "some sparks of bright knowledge." The exact correspondence in point of structure between this scale and the Platonic scales of being or pleasure is especially instructive in a philosopher who can hardly be accused of Platonizing tendencies.

(5) With the rise of Industrialism, pleasure, inasmuch as it required time taken from production of things, was not considered as a "good" at all. Bentham believed that different pleasures were different in duration and intensity. John Stuart Mill pointed out that they differed in quality. It was by the criterion of pleasure that Mill thought it better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied; the pleasures of Socrates, even if inferior to the fool's by Bentham's quantitive tests, are superior in quality, so that they deserve the name of pleasure in a sense in which the fool's do not.

(6) "The true descendant of the doctrines of Aquinas is the labor theory of value. The last of the Schoolmen was Karl Marx." "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism," by R.H.Tawney, p.36.

(7) It is well to bear in mind that the "social theories of Luther and Latimer, of Bucer and Bullinger, of sixteenth-century Anabaptists and seventeenth-century Levellers, of Puritans like Baxter, Anglicans like Laud, Baptists like Bunyan, Quakers like Bellers, are all the children of mediaeval parents." (ibid p.19).

SECTION V - CLASSES AND CLASS STRUGGLE

(1) "Industrial capitalism could not tolerate the slave South's control of the government, as it was concerned essentially with the production of goods and free trade threatened its markets, while it depended, moreover, upon mobile free wage-labor and needed a national banking system and transcontinental railroads, which the South opposed. Slavery not only repressed capitalism in the South, but

interfered with its expansion in the North and West." The conflict was the irrepressible one of two social systems involving the antagonistic relations of slave labor and free wage labor. "The Decline of American Capitalism," by Lewis Corey, p.24.

(2) Ref. "The Evolution of Culture," by Julius Lippert, translated by George Peter Murdock, Proffessor of Science of Society at Yale University, pp.284-6, 320-1.

(3) The "struggle of r ces" or, to be more accurate, the "struggle of tribes," is clearly depicted in Ward's "Pure Sociology." Also Bucher's "Industrial Evolution" (Ch. on theFormation of Social Classes). Also Kropotkin's "Ethics," and "Mutual Aid," a "Factor of Evolution."

(4) See note in text.

(5) "Slavery," Encycla.Britt.

(6) Class Divisions in the United States, 1870-1929

	1870	%	1920	%	1929	%
Working Class	5,860,000	46.9	27,015,000	64.9	33,000,000	68.5
Industrial workers	2,600,000	20.8	15,370,000	37.0	15,500,000	32.1
Other wage-earners	3,000,000	24.0	4,930,000	19.0	12,500,000	26.0
All wage-workers	5,600,000	44.8	23,300,000	56.0	28,000,000	58.1
Clerical	260,000	2.1	3,715,000	8.9	5,000,000	10.4
Farmers	4,550,000	36.4	8,500,000	20.5	7,500,000	15.5
Bourgeoisie	2,090,000	16.7	6,085,000	14.6	7,700,000	16.0
Lower (not obtainable)			3,759,000	9.0	4,575,000	9.5
Intermediate	"		2,100,000	5.1	2,750,000	5.7
Upper	"		226,000	0.5	375,000	.8

Note: Industrial workers includes wage-earners in manufactures, mining, railroads, water transportation, municipal traction, electric power, hired farm laborers, etc., but not wage workers in government service. Clerical, includes clerks in offices and stores, stenographers, typists,

office boys and messengers, and salespeople in stores. Farmers includes all non-wage workers and non-farmers with income below $5,000 yearly; intermediate bourgeoisie, incomes of $5,000 to $10,000; upper bourgeoisie incomes of $10,000 up.

Source: Computed from material in Bureau of the Census, "Census of Population;" Bureau of Internal Revenue, "Statistics of Income." (Taken from "The Decline of American Capitalism," by Lewis Corey, p.560).

(7) "From this ...standpoint, social life appears to us a system of more or less deeply rooted habits, corresponding to the needs of the community, or class. Some of them are habits of command, most of them are habits of obedience, whether we obey a person commanding by virtue of a mandate from society (or class leaders) or whether from society itself, vaguely imperative. Each of these habits of obedience exerts a pressure on our will. We can evade it, but then we are attracted towards it, drawn back to it, like a pendulum which has swung away from the vertical. A certain order of things has been upset, it must be restored (the seed of revolution). In a word, as with all habits, we feel a sense of obligation (right or wrong, though the cause may be). "Two Sources of Morality and Religion," Henri Bergson, p.2.

(8) "We may observe the different stages of development among the various social classes today in exact proportion to their mental and linguistic training. Some classes still use forbidden words in complete innocence, not because the words do not evoke sufficiently vivid mental images, or sufficiently definite ideas to bring them

under the ban." I use this to express what I have in mind when the same principle is carried further into industrial life. The quotation is from "The Evolution of Culture," by Julius Lippert, page 16.

(9) By 1900 the objective peculiarities of American class relations had almost disappeared, while the older ideology persisted. There was no longer any frontier with its perpetual renewal of classes and its influence on the instability of class relations. With the closing of the frontier around 1890, and particularly from 1900 to the World War, immigration was a major factor in whatever class fluidity still persisted. Immigration still permitted Americans of the older stocks to rise in the social scale who otherwise would not have risen, while social-economic differentiation among the immigrants produced a petty bourgeoisie in each racial group. This was true also among the Negro people.

(10) However, I feel that labor unionism has lost its force, in the more recent times. The decline of unionism was not merely the result of prosperity(1923-29) but of the new economic set-up. Craft unionism, adapted to small-scale, competitive capitalism, cannot survive in its old form the coming of monopoly capitalism, or the concentration of industry in larger aggregations of capital. This was admitted by John R. Commons, the father of the theory that the older American unionism and its limited objectives are eternal and the basis of the labor movement: "It may be that labor movements will be relegated to the history which now shrouds the guilds of the Middle

Ages or that craft unionism will turn to industrial unionism or communism." "Labor Movement," Encly. of Social Sciences, v.viii (1932), p.684.

(11) The calling out of the Militia to settle the Seamen's strike in San Francisco is a good illustration of what I have in mind.

(12) For example: that the farmers are no longer necessary to capitalist prosperity is brutally admitted by the New York Trust Comp ny in its publication, "The Index"(Jan.,1932,pp.16-17). "Another view widely held but not so frequently expressed is that, relatively, agriculture no longer constitutes a major factor in our highly industrialized economy.....While(the farmer's expenditures) are important and probably, as in the case of exports, represent a margin on which a good proportion of profits are based, they are not large enough to warrant the assertion that the national welfare depends to an overwhelming extent upon agricultural prosperity, or that recovery from depression can be brought about by restoring farm prices to their previous levels....In recent years American Industry has not been affected substiantially by changes in farm purchasing power."

(13) I feel the word more suitable for class distinctions in England, however, would be "caste."

(14) I refer back to the closing portion of Section IV("Modern Thought on the Subject") and further add, from the time of Adam Smith, the "classical" economic theory has constructed the foundations of economics in pure hedonism.

(15) "(This) is officially expressed, properly speaking, in the important fact that Calvin and the Calvinistic ethic, rejected the canonical veto on usury and the scholastic theory of money, and on the contrary supported a doctrine of money, credit, and usury, which were nearer (with limitations) to the modern economic idea." (The Social Teaching of the Christian Church, Ernst Troeltsch, vol.2, p.645).

16) Such an individual fails to realize (usually due to limited interests and outlook) that, when the age of the Reformation began, economics was still a branch of ethics, and ethics of theology; all human activities were treated as falling within a single scheme, whose character was determined by the spiritual destiny of mankind; the appeal of theorists was to natural law, not to utility; the legitimacy of economic transactions was tried by reference, less to the movements of the market, than to moral standards derived from the traditional teaching of the Christian Church.

(17) For example, a man recently called to be Rector of Trinity Church in San Francisco, was denounced by the City Chamber of Commerce because he had picketed in a strike in Brooklyn. The result was the Vestry asking him to decline accepting the "call."

(18) See reference in text.

(19) The Manchester School possessed a doctrinaire optimism, the brutal glorification of competition as the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence, and finally the thoughtlessness with which today capitalistic civilization accepts <u>as its destiny</u> its feverish

labour, its crises, its specialization, and its vocational humanism.

(20) to (28) inclusive, reference in text.

(29) Page 458

(30) and (31), reference in text.

(32) "The Modern Theme," by Jose Ortega y Gasset, p.103.

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Note: This "bibliography" represents four years of work. I have been majoring in "Christian Sociology" for that long. My thesis includes notes taken over this period of time. Unfortunately, I have lost the place and date of publication of three or four books, but it has been where I have taken a note I felt worth while. Rather than discard the notes, I have not hesitated to use them. The work included in this thesis represents notes and study in Europe as well as in America.

Wallace deOrtega Maxey

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